Dovecot mail server https://www.dovecot.org/
You can not select more than 25 topics Topics must start with a letter or number, can include dashes ('-') and can be up to 35 characters long.
 
 
 
 
 

755 lines
21 KiB

/*
* GSSAPI Module
*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Jelmer Vernooij <jelmer@samba.org>
*
* Related standards:
* - draft-ietf-sasl-gssapi-03
* - RFC2222
*
* Some parts inspired by an older patch from Colin Walters
*
* This software is released under the MIT license.
*/
#include "lib.h"
#include "env-util.h"
#include "str.h"
#include "str-sanitize.h"
#include "hex-binary.h"
#include "safe-memset.h"
#include "sasl-server-protected.h"
#include "sasl-server-gssapi.h"
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
# include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
#elif defined (HAVE_GSSAPI_H)
# include <gssapi.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
# include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
#elif defined (HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H)
# include <gssapi_krb5.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_EXT_H
# include <gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>
#endif
#define krb5_boolean2bool(X) ((X) != 0)
/* Non-zero flags defined in RFC 2222 */
enum sasl_gssapi_qop {
SASL_GSSAPI_QOP_UNSPECIFIED = 0x00,
SASL_GSSAPI_QOP_AUTH_ONLY = 0x01,
SASL_GSSAPI_QOP_AUTH_INT = 0x02,
SASL_GSSAPI_QOP_AUTH_CONF = 0x04
};
struct gssapi_auth_request {
struct sasl_server_mech_request auth_request;
gss_ctx_id_t gss_ctx;
gss_cred_id_t service_cred;
enum {
GSS_STATE_SEC_CONTEXT,
GSS_STATE_WRAP,
GSS_STATE_UNWRAP
} sasl_gssapi_state;
gss_name_t authn_name;
gss_name_t authz_name;
};
struct gssapi_auth_mech {
struct sasl_server_mech mech;
const char *hostname;
};
static gss_OID_desc mech_gssapi_krb5_oid =
{ 9, "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02" };
static int
mech_gssapi_wrap(struct gssapi_auth_request *request, gss_buffer_desc inbuf);
static void
mech_gssapi_log_error(struct gssapi_auth_request *request,
OM_uint32 status_value, int status_type,
const char *description)
{
struct sasl_server_mech_request *auth_request = &request->auth_request;
OM_uint32 message_context = 0;
OM_uint32 minor_status;
gss_buffer_desc status_string;
do {
(void)gss_display_status(&minor_status, status_value,
status_type, GSS_C_NO_OID,
&message_context, &status_string);
e_info(auth_request->event, "While %s: %s", description,
str_sanitize(status_string.value, SIZE_MAX));
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &status_string);
} while (message_context != 0);
}
static struct sasl_server_mech_request *
mech_gssapi_auth_new(const struct sasl_server_mech *mech ATTR_UNUSED,
pool_t pool)
{
struct gssapi_auth_request *request;
request = p_new(pool, struct gssapi_auth_request, 1);
request->gss_ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
return &request->auth_request;
}
static OM_uint32
obtain_service_credentials(struct gssapi_auth_request *request,
gss_cred_id_t *ret_r)
{
struct sasl_server_mech_request *auth_request = &request->auth_request;
const struct gssapi_auth_mech *gss_mech =
container_of(auth_request->mech,
const struct gssapi_auth_mech, mech);
OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
string_t *principal_name;
gss_buffer_desc inbuf;
gss_name_t gss_principal;
if (strcmp(gss_mech->hostname, "$ALL") == 0) {
e_debug(auth_request->event, "Using all keytab entries");
*ret_r = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
principal_name = t_str_new(128);
str_append(principal_name, auth_request->protocol);
str_append_c(principal_name, '@');
str_append(principal_name, gss_mech->hostname);
e_debug(auth_request->event, "Obtaining credentials for %s",
str_c(principal_name));
inbuf.length = str_len(principal_name);
inbuf.value = str_c_modifiable(principal_name);
major_status = gss_import_name(&minor_status, &inbuf,
GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE,
&gss_principal);
str_free(&principal_name);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status) != 0) {
mech_gssapi_log_error(request, major_status, GSS_C_GSS_CODE,
"importing principal name");
return major_status;
}
major_status = gss_acquire_cred(&minor_status, gss_principal, 0,
GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET, GSS_C_ACCEPT,
ret_r, NULL, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status) != 0) {
mech_gssapi_log_error(request, major_status, GSS_C_GSS_CODE,
"acquiring service credentials");
mech_gssapi_log_error(request, minor_status, GSS_C_MECH_CODE,
"acquiring service credentials");
return major_status;
}
gss_release_name(&minor_status, &gss_principal);
return major_status;
}
static gss_name_t
import_name(struct gssapi_auth_request *request, void *str, size_t len)
{
OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
gss_buffer_desc name_buf;
gss_name_t name;
name_buf.value = str;
name_buf.length = len;
major_status = gss_import_name(&minor_status, &name_buf,
GSS_C_NO_OID, &name);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status) != 0) {
mech_gssapi_log_error(request, major_status, GSS_C_GSS_CODE,
"gss_import_name");
return GSS_C_NO_NAME;
}
return name;
}
static gss_name_t
duplicate_name(struct gssapi_auth_request *request, gss_name_t old)
{
OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
gss_name_t new;
major_status = gss_duplicate_name(&minor_status, old, &new);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status) != 0) {
mech_gssapi_log_error(request, major_status, GSS_C_GSS_CODE,
"gss_duplicate_name");
return GSS_C_NO_NAME;
}
return new;
}
static bool data_has_nuls(const void *data, size_t len)
{
const unsigned char *c = data;
size_t i;
/* apparently all names end with NUL? */
if (len > 0 && c[len-1] == '\0')
len--;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (c[i] == '\0')
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
static int
get_display_name(struct gssapi_auth_request *request, gss_name_t name,
gss_OID *name_type_r, const char **display_name_r)
{
struct sasl_server_mech_request *auth_request = &request->auth_request;
OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
gss_buffer_desc buf;
major_status = gss_display_name(&minor_status, name,
&buf, name_type_r);
if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
mech_gssapi_log_error(request, major_status, GSS_C_GSS_CODE,
"gss_display_name");
return -1;
}
if (data_has_nuls(buf.value, buf.length)) {
e_info(auth_request->event, "authn_name has NULs");
return -1;
}
*display_name_r = t_strndup(buf.value, buf.length);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &buf);
return 0;
}
static bool
mech_gssapi_oid_cmp(const gss_OID_desc *oid1, const gss_OID_desc *oid2)
{
return (oid1->length == oid2->length &&
mem_equals_timing_safe(oid1->elements, oid2->elements,
oid1->length));
}
static int
mech_gssapi_sec_context(struct gssapi_auth_request *request,
gss_buffer_desc inbuf)
{
struct sasl_server_mech_request *auth_request = &request->auth_request;
OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
gss_buffer_desc output_token;
gss_OID name_type;
gss_OID mech_type;
const char *username;
int ret = 0;
major_status = gss_accept_sec_context (
&minor_status,
&request->gss_ctx,
request->service_cred,
&inbuf,
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
&request->authn_name,
&mech_type,
&output_token,
NULL, /* ret_flags */
NULL, /* time_rec */
NULL /* delegated_cred_handle */
);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status) != 0) {
mech_gssapi_log_error(request, major_status, GSS_C_GSS_CODE,
"processing incoming data");
mech_gssapi_log_error(request, minor_status, GSS_C_MECH_CODE,
"processing incoming data");
return -1;
}
switch (major_status) {
case GSS_S_COMPLETE:
if (!mech_gssapi_oid_cmp(mech_type, &mech_gssapi_krb5_oid)) {
e_info(auth_request->event,
"GSSAPI mechanism not Kerberos5");
ret = -1;
} else if (get_display_name(request, request->authn_name,
&name_type, &username) < 0)
ret = -1;
else if (!sasl_server_request_set_authid(
auth_request, SASL_SERVER_AUTHID_TYPE_USERNAME,
username)) {
ret = -1;
} else {
request->sasl_gssapi_state = GSS_STATE_WRAP;
e_debug(auth_request->event,
"security context state completed.");
}
break;
case GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED:
e_debug(auth_request->event,
"Processed incoming packet correctly, "
"waiting for another.");
break;
default:
e_error(auth_request->event,
"Received unexpected major status %d", major_status);
break;
}
if (ret == 0) {
if (output_token.length > 0) {
sasl_server_request_output(auth_request,
output_token.value,
output_token.length);
} else {
/* If there is no output token, go straight to wrap,
which is expecting an empty input token. */
ret = mech_gssapi_wrap(request, output_token);
}
}
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &output_token);
return ret;
}
static int
mech_gssapi_wrap(struct gssapi_auth_request *request, gss_buffer_desc inbuf)
{
struct sasl_server_mech_request *auth_request = &request->auth_request;
OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
gss_buffer_desc outbuf;
unsigned char ret[4];
/* The client's return data should be empty here */
/* Only authentication, no integrity or confidentiality protection
(yet?) */
ret[0] = (SASL_GSSAPI_QOP_UNSPECIFIED |
SASL_GSSAPI_QOP_AUTH_ONLY);
ret[1] = 0xFF;
ret[2] = 0xFF;
ret[3] = 0xFF;
inbuf.length = 4;
inbuf.value = ret;
major_status = gss_wrap(&minor_status, request->gss_ctx, 0,
GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &inbuf, NULL, &outbuf);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status) != 0) {
mech_gssapi_log_error(request, major_status, GSS_C_GSS_CODE,
"sending security layer negotiation");
mech_gssapi_log_error(request, minor_status, GSS_C_MECH_CODE,
"sending security layer negotiation");
return -1;
}
e_debug(auth_request->event, "Negotiated security layer");
sasl_server_request_output(auth_request, outbuf.value, outbuf.length);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &outbuf);
request->sasl_gssapi_state = GSS_STATE_UNWRAP;
return 0;
}
static bool
k5_principal_is_authorized(struct gssapi_auth_request *request, const char *name)
{
struct sasl_server_mech_request *auth_request = &request->auth_request;
const char *value, *const *authorized_names, *const *tmp;
if (!sasl_server_request_get_extra_field(auth_request, "k5principals",
&value))
return FALSE;
authorized_names = t_strsplit_spaces(value, ",");
for (tmp = authorized_names; *tmp != NULL; tmp++) {
if (strcmp(*tmp, name) == 0) {
e_debug(auth_request->event,
"authorized by k5principals field: %s", name);
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
static bool
mech_gssapi_krb5_userok(struct gssapi_auth_request *request,
gss_name_t name, const char *login_user,
bool check_name_type)
{
struct sasl_server_mech_request *auth_request = &request->auth_request;
krb5_context ctx;
krb5_principal princ;
krb5_error_code krb5_err;
gss_OID name_type;
const char *princ_display_name;
bool authorized = FALSE;
/* Parse out the principal's username */
if (get_display_name(request, name, &name_type,
&princ_display_name) < 0)
return FALSE;
if (!mech_gssapi_oid_cmp(name_type, GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME) &&
check_name_type) {
e_info(auth_request->event, "OID not kerberos principal name");
return FALSE;
}
/* Init a krb5 context and parse the principal username */
krb5_err = krb5_init_context(&ctx);
if (krb5_err != 0) {
e_error(auth_request->event, "krb5_init_context() failed: %d",
(int)krb5_err);
return FALSE;
}
krb5_err = krb5_parse_name(ctx, princ_display_name, &princ);
if (krb5_err != 0) {
/* writing the error string would be better, but we probably
rarely get here and there doesn't seem to be a standard
way of getting it */
e_info(auth_request->event, "krb5_parse_name() failed: %d",
(int)krb5_err);
} else {
/* See if the principal is in the list of authorized principals
for the user */
authorized = k5_principal_is_authorized(request,
princ_display_name);
/* See if the principal is authorized to act as the specified
(UNIX) user */
if (!authorized) {
authorized = krb5_boolean2bool(
krb5_kuserok(ctx, princ, login_user));
}
krb5_free_principal(ctx, princ);
}
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return authorized;
}
static int
mech_gssapi_userok(struct gssapi_auth_request *request, const char *login_user)
{
struct sasl_server_mech_request *auth_request = &request->auth_request;
OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
int equal_authn_authz;
/* If authn and authz names equal, don't bother checking further. */
major_status = gss_compare_name(&minor_status,
request->authn_name,
request->authz_name,
&equal_authn_authz);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status) != 0) {
mech_gssapi_log_error(request, major_status, GSS_C_GSS_CODE,
"gss_compare_name failed");
return -1;
}
if (equal_authn_authz != 0)
return 0;
if (!mech_gssapi_krb5_userok(request, request->authn_name,
login_user, TRUE)) {
e_info(auth_request->event,
"User not authorized to log in as %s", login_user);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static void
gssapi_credentials_callback(struct sasl_server_mech_request *auth_request,
const struct sasl_passdb_result *result)
{
struct gssapi_auth_request *request =
container_of(auth_request, struct gssapi_auth_request,
auth_request);
/* We don't care much whether the lookup succeeded or not because GSSAPI
does not strictly require a passdb. But if a passdb is configured,
now the k5principals field will have been filled in. */
switch (result->status) {
case SASL_PASSDB_RESULT_INTERNAL_FAILURE:
sasl_server_request_internal_failure(auth_request);
return;
case SASL_PASSDB_RESULT_USER_DISABLED:
case SASL_PASSDB_RESULT_PASS_EXPIRED:
/* User is explicitly disabled, don't allow it to log in */
sasl_server_request_failure(auth_request);
return;
case SASL_PASSDB_RESULT_SCHEME_NOT_AVAILABLE:
case SASL_PASSDB_RESULT_USER_UNKNOWN:
case SASL_PASSDB_RESULT_PASSWORD_MISMATCH:
case SASL_PASSDB_RESULT_OK:
break;
}
if (mech_gssapi_userok(request, auth_request->authid) == 0)
sasl_server_request_success(auth_request, NULL, 0);
else
sasl_server_request_failure(auth_request);
}
static int
mech_gssapi_unwrap(struct gssapi_auth_request *request, gss_buffer_desc inbuf)
{
struct sasl_server_mech_request *auth_request = &request->auth_request;
OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
gss_buffer_desc outbuf;
const char *login_user;
unsigned char *name;
size_t name_len;
major_status = gss_unwrap(&minor_status, request->gss_ctx,
&inbuf, &outbuf, NULL, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status) != 0) {
mech_gssapi_log_error(request, major_status, GSS_C_GSS_CODE,
"final negotiation: gss_unwrap");
return -1;
}
/* outbuf[0] contains bitmask for selected security layer,
outbuf[1..3] contains maximum output_message size */
if (outbuf.length < 4) {
e_error(auth_request->event, "Invalid response length");
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &outbuf);
return -1;
}
if (outbuf.length > 4) {
name = (unsigned char *)outbuf.value + 4;
name_len = outbuf.length - 4;
if (data_has_nuls(name, name_len)) {
e_info(auth_request->event, "authz_name has NULs");
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &outbuf);
return -1;
}
login_user = p_strndup(auth_request->pool, name, name_len);
request->authz_name = import_name(request, name, name_len);
} else {
request->authz_name = duplicate_name(request,
request->authn_name);
if (get_display_name(request, request->authz_name,
NULL, &login_user) < 0) {
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &outbuf);
return -1;
}
}
if (request->authz_name == GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
e_info(auth_request->event, "no authz_name");
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &outbuf);
return -1;
}
/* Set username early, so that the credential lookup is for the
authorizing user. This means the username in subsequent log messages
will be the authorization name, not the authentication name, which
may mean that future log messages should be adjusted to log the right
thing. */
if (!sasl_server_request_set_authid(auth_request,
SASL_SERVER_AUTHID_TYPE_USERNAME,
login_user)) {
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &outbuf);
return -1;
}
/* Continue in callback once auth_request is populated with passdb
information. */
sasl_server_request_lookup_credentials(auth_request, "",
gssapi_credentials_callback);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &outbuf);
return 0;
}
static void
mech_gssapi_auth_continue(struct sasl_server_mech_request *auth_request,
const unsigned char *data, size_t data_size)
{
struct gssapi_auth_request *request =
container_of(auth_request, struct gssapi_auth_request,
auth_request);
gss_buffer_desc inbuf;
int ret = -1;
inbuf.value = (void *)data;
inbuf.length = data_size;
switch (request->sasl_gssapi_state) {
case GSS_STATE_SEC_CONTEXT:
ret = mech_gssapi_sec_context(request, inbuf);
break;
case GSS_STATE_WRAP:
ret = mech_gssapi_wrap(request, inbuf);
break;
case GSS_STATE_UNWRAP:
ret = mech_gssapi_unwrap(request, inbuf);
break;
default:
i_unreached();
}
if (ret < 0)
sasl_server_request_failure(auth_request);
}
static void
mech_gssapi_auth_initial(struct sasl_server_mech_request *auth_request,
const unsigned char *data, size_t data_size)
{
struct gssapi_auth_request *request =
container_of(auth_request, struct gssapi_auth_request,
auth_request);
OM_uint32 major_status;
major_status =
obtain_service_credentials(request, &request->service_cred);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status) != 0) {
sasl_server_request_internal_failure(auth_request);
return;
}
request->authn_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
request->authz_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
request->sasl_gssapi_state = GSS_STATE_SEC_CONTEXT;
if (data == NULL) {
/* The client should go first */
sasl_server_request_output(auth_request, uchar_empty_ptr, 0);
} else {
mech_gssapi_auth_continue(auth_request, data, data_size);
}
}
static void
mech_gssapi_auth_free(struct sasl_server_mech_request *auth_request)
{
struct gssapi_auth_request *request =
container_of(auth_request, struct gssapi_auth_request,
auth_request);
OM_uint32 minor_status;
if (request->gss_ctx != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
(void)gss_delete_sec_context(&minor_status, &request->gss_ctx,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
}
if (request->service_cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
(void)gss_release_cred(&minor_status, &request->service_cred);
if (request->authn_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
(void)gss_release_name(&minor_status, &request->authn_name);
if (request->authz_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
(void)gss_release_name(&minor_status, &request->authz_name);
}
static struct sasl_server_mech *mech_gssapi_mech_new(pool_t pool)
{
struct gssapi_auth_mech *gss_mech;
gss_mech = p_new(pool, struct gssapi_auth_mech, 1);
return &gss_mech->mech;
}
static const struct sasl_server_mech_funcs mech_gssapi_funcs = {
.auth_new = mech_gssapi_auth_new,
.auth_initial = mech_gssapi_auth_initial,
.auth_continue = mech_gssapi_auth_continue,
.auth_free = mech_gssapi_auth_free,
.mech_new = mech_gssapi_mech_new,
};
static const struct sasl_server_mech_def mech_gssapi = {
.name = SASL_MECH_NAME_GSSAPI,
.flags = SASL_MECH_SEC_ALLOW_NULS,
.passdb_need = SASL_MECH_PASSDB_NEED_NOTHING,
.funcs = &mech_gssapi_funcs,
};
/* MIT Kerberos v1.5+ and Heimdal v0.7+ support SPNEGO for Kerberos tickets
internally. Nothing else needs to be done here. Note, however, that this does
not support SPNEGO when the only available credential is NTLM. */
static const struct sasl_server_mech_def mech_gss_spnego = {
.name = SASL_MECH_NAME_GSS_SPNEGO,
.flags = SASL_MECH_SEC_ALLOW_NULS,
.passdb_need = SASL_MECH_PASSDB_NEED_NOTHING,
.funcs = &mech_gssapi_funcs,
};
static void
mech_gssapi_register(struct sasl_server_instance *sinst,
const struct sasl_server_mech_def *mech_def,
const struct sasl_server_gssapi_settings *set)
{
struct sasl_server_mech *mech;
struct gssapi_auth_mech *gss_mech;
mech = sasl_server_mech_register(sinst, mech_def, NULL);
gss_mech = container_of(mech, struct gssapi_auth_mech, mech);
gss_mech->hostname = p_strdup(mech->pool, set->hostname);
const char *path = set->krb5_keytab;
if (path != NULL && *path != '\0') {
/* Environment may be used by Kerberos 5 library directly */
env_put("KRB5_KTNAME", path);
#ifdef HAVE_GSSKRB5_REGISTER_ACCEPTOR_IDENTITY
gsskrb5_register_acceptor_identity(path);
#elif defined (HAVE_KRB5_GSS_REGISTER_ACCEPTOR_IDENTITY)
krb5_gss_register_acceptor_identity(path);
#endif
}
}
void sasl_server_mech_register_gssapi(
struct sasl_server_instance *sinst,
const struct sasl_server_gssapi_settings *set)
{
mech_gssapi_register(sinst, &mech_gssapi, set);
}
void sasl_server_mech_unregister_gssapi(struct sasl_server_instance *sinst)
{
sasl_server_mech_unregister(sinst, &mech_gssapi);
}
void sasl_server_mech_register_gss_spnego(
struct sasl_server_instance *sinst,
const struct sasl_server_gssapi_settings *set)
{
mech_gssapi_register(sinst, &mech_gss_spnego, set);
}
void sasl_server_mech_unregister_gss_spnego(struct sasl_server_instance *sinst)
{
sasl_server_mech_unregister(sinst, &mech_gss_spnego);
}